Trade Regulations—Sherman Act—Conspiracy—Conscious Parallelism.—Delaware Valley Marine Supply Co. v. American Tobacco Co by McDermott, Edward J
Boston College Law Review
Volume 3 | Issue 3 Article 27
4-1-1962
Trade Regulations—Sherman
Act—Conspiracy—Conscious
Parallelism.—Delaware Valley Marine Supply Co.
v. American Tobacco Co
Edward J. McDermott
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons
This Casenotes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Edward J. McDermott, Trade Regulations—Sherman Act—Conspiracy—Conscious
Parallelism.—Delaware Valley Marine Supply Co. v. American Tobacco Co, 3 B.C.L. Rev. 569 (1962),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol3/iss3/27
CASE NOTES
Should recovery be allowed where persons other than directors, officers, and
ten percent stockholders who, because of their relationship to insiders,
whether it be through marriage, friendship, partnership or other business
associations, might be presumed to have access to confidential information?
These difficulties lend themselves to legislative inquiry and enactments
better than to judicial contortions. Quite clearly, Congress should act, since
Blau v. Lehman has clearly established that there is no provision in the act
to curb the transfer to and the use of confidential information by non-
insiders and, especially, the investment brokerage firms.
RICHARD M. GABERMAN
Trade Regulations—Sherman Act—Conspiracy—Conscious Parallelism.
—Delaware Valley Marine Supply Co. v. American Tobacco Co.1—The
Delaware Valley Marine Supply Company was organized to sell tax-free
tobacco and liquor to vessels engaged in foreign trade in the Port of Phila-
delphia. In order to purchase tax-free cigarettes a ship chandler must obtain
a direct listing. The Supply Company applied for the listing to five major
tobacco companies doing business in the Port. Each company had at least
one distributor for the Port at that time, Lipschutz Bros. R. J. Reynolds and
P. Lorillard also sold to a third distributor who dealt in all ship supplies.
Two companies refused by letter, two did not reply and Philip Morris de-
clined to grant the listing after a preliminary investigation. This precluded
plaintiff from entering the sea stores business. Plaintiff brought this suit for
treble damages alleging a conspiracy in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act.2 The plaintiff did not introduce direct evidence of conspiracy but relied
heavily on "conscious parallelism," claiming that the tobacco companies
showed a consciously uniform business behavior by their refusals. It was
common knowledge in the business that to sell sea stores, all the major
brands of cigarettes must be procured. There was other evidence that the
cigarette companies were adequately represented in this market, that their
sales were increasing and that they had no financial interest in the com-
petitor, Lipschutz, which would prompt the alleged behavior. The lower
court granted the defendants a directed verdict on the ground that the
plaintiff had not proved damage, 3 expressly avoiding the question of con-
spiracy.4 The Court of Appeals affirmed. HELD: Even assuming the evi-
dence supported the existence of conscious parallelism, the plaintiff had
1 297 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1961), petition for cert. filed, 30 U.S.L. Week 3267 (Feb, 20,
1962) (No. 734).
2 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C, § 1 (1958). The section in substance
provides: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or con-
spiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal. . . ."
3
 Delaware Valley Marine Supply Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 184 F. Supp. 440
(E.D. Pa. 1961).
4
 Id. at 449.
569
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
failed to produce evidence from which a jury could find that the defendants
had conspired in refusing to dealt with the plaintiff.
Originally, Standard Oil Co. v. United States5 and United States v.
American Tobacco Co.° set down the "rule of reason" test which has been the
basic approach in antitrust cases under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 7
Later, the U.S. Supreme Court held that private agreements to fix prices
necessarily fell within the prohibition of the act and thus the "per se" viola-
tion was recognized.9 It was also early recognized that proof of a section 1
conspiracy is difficult and that direct evidence or testimony may be im-
possible but that conspiracy could be inferred from the result in a given
situation.9 In 1939, the concept of conscious parallelism was spotlighted by
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States." There, motion picture distributors
and theatre chain operators in New Mexico and Texas were convicted of
section I violations when they sought to impose restrictions as to prices to
be charged for .movie admissions. The government's major evidence was a
letter from one of the theatre chain operators, Interstate Circuit, to all of
the distributors. The names of all distributors were listed on every letter as
addressees. The letter asked that certain conditions be observed to assure
continued exhibition of the distributors' films by Interstate. One of the con-
ditions was that the films be distributed only to theatres using the set ad-
mission prices. The arrangement lasted for two years. The government intro-
duced no direct evidence of the alleged conspiracy yet the court found that
the defendants had conspired to restrain trade:
It was enough that, knowing that concerted action was contemplated
and invited, the distributors gave their adherence to the scheme
and participated in it. Each distributor was advised that the others
were asked to participate; each knew that cooperation was essential
to successful operation of the plan. They knew that the plan, if
carried out, would result in a restraint of commerce, which . . .
was unreasonable within the meaning of the Sherman Act, and
knowing it, all participated in the plan. 0
Thus, consciously parallel business behavior was indicative of concerted ac-
tion upon which the conspiracy conviction was upheld.
It was felt that in Interstate Circuit, Mr. Justice Stone had not meant
to take agreement out of antitrust conspiracy.'2
 However, the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit heavily emphasized conscious parallelism in
three cases which came before it after Interstate Circuit." These cases in-
5 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
221 U.S. 106 (1911).
7 Supra note 2.
8 United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 US.
Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v.
(1914)10 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
11 Id. at 226.
12 Rahl, Conspiracy and the Anti-Trust Laws, 44
13 Milgram v. Loew's, Inc., 192 F.2d 579 (3d Cir.
392 (1927).
United States, 234 U.S. 600, 612
Ill. L. Rev. 743, 759 (1949).
1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 929
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volved the uniform refusal of defendant motion picture distributors to license
plaintiff's theatre for films on the runs" he felt his location warranted. There
was no express agreement by the distributors by which concert of action
necessary for conspiracy could be shown. The court's language in each
opinion indicated that it considered uniform conduct of the defendants an
extremely important factor in affirming the finding of conspiracy violations
on the facts." However, in the Milgram case, the court by way of dictum
did specify a limitation on the adverse effect of uniform parallel business
behavior, declaring: "This does not mean . . . that in every case mere con-
sciously parallel business practices are sufficient evidence in themselves,
from which a court may infer concerted action.""
A severe blow was dealt to any theory holding that conscious parallelism
could form the sole basis of an antitrust conspiracy by Theatre Enterprises
v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp.' 7 Mr. Justice Clark, after agreeing
that business behavior is admissible circumstantial evidence from which the
factfinder may infer agreement, continued:
But this Court has never held that proof of parallel business be-
havior conclusively establishes agreement or, itself constitutes a
Sherman Act offense. Circumstantial evidence of consciously par-
allel behavior may have made heavy inroads into the judicial at-
titude toward conspiracy; but "conscious parallelism" has not yet
read conspiracy out of the Sherman Act entirely."
This statement, and the dictum in the above mentioned Milgram case, find
support in the present opinion. The Court of Appeals admitted that con-
scious parallelism "is of aid in demonstrating the existence of sophisticated
and silent agreements which have so often seriously restrained trade.""
Yet it also recognized that conspiracy remains the essential element of a
section 1 case,2° and that on the facts the plaintiff, even assuming con-
sciously parallel behavior by the defendants to have been shown, had not
produced enough evidence for consideration by the jury. The court also
(1952) ; Ball v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 169 F.2d 317 (3d Cir. 1948), cert. denied,
339 U.S. 911 (1950); William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 150 F.2d 738
(3d Cir. 1945).
14 "Runs are successive exhibitions of a feature in a given area, first run being
the first exhibition in that area, second run being the next subsequent, and so on, and
include successive exhibitions in different theatres, even though such theatres may be
under a common ownership or managements." United States v. Paramount Pictures,
Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 144 n.6 (1948).
15
 These cases have Ied several writers to conclude that the court was using a
new doctrine of conspiracy, namely, conscious parallelism replaces the requirement of
an agreement for an antitrust conspiracy. See Conant, Consciously Parallel Action in
Restraint of Trade, 38 Minn. L. Rev. 797 (1954); Note, The Nature of a Sherman
Act Conspiracy, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 1108 (1954).
18 Supra note 15, at 583.
17 346 U.S. 537 (1954).
18 Id. at 541.
19 297 F.2d at 202.
2° Ibid.
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found that the circumstances in this case were in striking contrast to other
cases where courts have found conspiracy premised on the doctrine of
conscious paralIelism. 2 ' In observing that sound business practice could
also have explained the defendants' conduct, the court took notice of the
fact that the defendants had only two courses of action open to them, i.e.,
to grant or to refuse the listing. In addition, adequate representation in the
market, rising sales, their poor experience with one distributor which went
bankrupt, the plaintiff's lack of experience in the business and that the
refusals were neither identical nor automatic were all influential factors in
the court's decision that conscious parallelism was not enough. Thus, the
court felt that reasonable men could not differ as to the fact that the de-
fendants had not conspired against the plaintiff.
The case is a further retreat from the strong language and emphasis on
conscious parallelism seen in earlier Third Circuit opinions." The court
requires a substantial basis for an inference of a conspiracy violation of
section 1. Where the evidence offered is enough to rebut the inferences of
agreement established by proof of parallel conduct and rational business
justifications are produced, the court will refuse to allow purely circum-
stantial evidence by way of conscious parallelism to permit submission of
antitrust conspiracy to the jury.
The value of conscious parallelism has been much discussed." The
views range widely but there is an underlying attitude discernible which
realizes that conscious parallelism may be a very useful tool in the antitrust
field. There is a sensible reluctance to utilize conscious parallelism as an-
other basis for a violation of the Sherman Act. An important reason behind
this view is that in oligopoly situations, competing firms are bound to be
conscious of one another's activities in all phases, including marketing and
pricing. It would be foolhardy not to be aware of such policies especially
where there is little real difference in product. It is quite probable that in
many such instances, conscious parallelism may be dictated solely by eco-
nomic necessity. Avoidance of price wars is a common instance where this
takes place. It is certainly to be admitted that the fewer firms involved,
21 Id. at 205 n.19. The court here listed three circumstances, two of which it said
were present in the three cases, in addition to conscious parallelism: (1) "plus" factors
such as those emphasized in simple refusal to deal cases; (2) parallelism of a much
more elaborate and complex nature; (3) a web of circumstantial evidence pointing very
convincingly to the ultimate fact of agreement.
22 Supra note 13. It should be noted that in each of the cases there was something
else in addition to conscious parallelism, as the court in the instant case observed.
Particularly noteworthy in Goldman and Ball was that the plaintiff offered higher
premiums for the films than was paid by competing theatres. There, then, there was
strong evidence that each distributor was acting in apparent contradiction of his own
self interest.
28 See Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious
Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 655 (1962) ; Givens, Parallel
Conduct Under the Sherman Act, 5 Antitrust Bull. 273 (1960); Schwartz, New Ap-
proaches to the Control of Oligopoly, 109 Pa. L. Rev. 31 (1960) ; Report of Attorney
General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws 39 (1955); Note, Conscious
Parallelism—Fact Or Fancy?, 3 Stan. L. Rev. 679 (1951).
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the easier it is to conceal a conspiracy in restraint of trade. Legislation has
been suggested to meet problems where there is a monopoly by a few
firms." That may well be the answer and it should be more effective than a
judicially evolved section 1 violation. The court in the instant case, by
clarifying the language of previous cases, has taken a strong step in solidify-
ing the usefulness of conscious parallelism, viz., it does not of itself con-
stitute conclusive proof of conspiracy but it is relevant evidence to be
weighed with other factors in the detection of an antitrust conspiracy.
EDWARD J. MCDERMOTT
Uniform Commercial Code—Statutory Construction—Additional Terms
in Acceptance or Confirmation.—Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F. P. Bartlett fg
Co.'—Plaintiff, a manufacturer of cellophane bags for packing vegetables,
ordered from the defendant some emulsion which serves as a cellophane
adhesive. The defendant acknowledged before sending the product, the
acknowledgment including a disclaimer of all warranties and guaranties.
Upon receiving the emulsion, the plaintiff found it to be non-adhesive for his
purposes, and brought suit for breach of warranty, whereupon the defendant
set up the disclaimer as a defense. The United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts found for the defendant, and the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. HELD: Section 2-207 of
the Uniform Commercial Code controls, and the written acknowledgment
was effective even though it materially altered the offer, where plaintiff,
knowing of the alteration, voiced no objection and accepted and used the
goods.
The law of acceptance prior to the adoption of the Uniform Commercial
Code had been subjected to much criticism. At first, and for a considerable
period of time, it was certain that an acceptance varying the terms of the
offer constituted a rejection; 2 such acceptance could constitute a counter-
offer.6 However, even under these rules, "an acceptance which merely
requests a change or addition to the terms of the offer is not thereby invali-
dated unless the acceptance is made to depend on assent to the changed or
added terms."4
The drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code attempted to resolve
all doubts in this area. To this end, Section 2-2076 was incorporated into the
24 See articles supra note 15.
297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962).
2 Kehlor Flour Mills Co. v. Lindon	 Lindstroem, 230 Mass. 119, 119 N.E. 698
(1918) ; Saco-Lowell Shops v. Clinton Mills Co., 277 Fed. 349 (1st Cir. 1921).
a Kennedy v. Russell, 280 Mass. 510, 182 N.E. 834 (1932) ; Restatement, Contracts
60 (1932).
4 Restatement, Contracts § 62 (1932).
5 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 106, § 2-207 (1958) provides:
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation
which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it
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